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The low skilled are less mobile geographically because of the
meagre value of work
Survey evidence has shown that those with low skill levels are less likely to move. Many in
academic and policy circles believe this is caused by relatively high moving costs. In new
research that examines people’s motivations for moving, Michael Amior finds that the meagre
value of low skilled jobs is the major factor restricting their geographical mobility. Workers have
little incentive to search for jobs in other cities, and firms are reluctant to invest in long distance
recruitment. As a result, he writes, low skilled workers in declining cities are often forced to move
speculatively (at great cost), without a job in hand. 
It is well known that workers with better education levels are more likely to move, while the low skilled are less
mobile geographically. Figure 1 shows a modest effect of education on cross-county migration (based on survey
data), though only for the under-35s. But, Figure 2 shows these skill differences are entirely driven by people who
report moving for job reasons. Among the 25-34s, those with postgraduate qualifications make three times as
many job-motivated moves as high school dropouts. And there is a clear education effect for older workers too.
Figure 1 – Annual cross-county migration rates (1999-2013)
Source: Current Population Survey.
Figure 2 – Annual migration rates, by reported reason for moving (1999-2013)
Source: Current Population Survey.
But, this steep skill gradient is swamped by a large number of “non-job”moves (primarily family and housing-
related), whose frequency (if anything) decreases by education level. This suggests the low skilled are no less
capable of moving long distances. In light of this, the fact that so few of them move for job reasons is both
surprising and concerning. Regional disparities in jobless rates have persisted over many decades, driven by
long-term changes in the structure of industry. Low skilled labor has borne the brunt of this, notably in the
traditional manufacturing heartlands of the Rust Belt. But despite this, research has consistently found that lower
skilled workers are less likely to leave cities suffering declining employment.
How can these facts be explained? In new research, I argue that the obstacles to low skilled mobility are exactly
those which sustain high levels of low skilled joblessness: meagre returns to employment, for both workers and
firms. These meagre returns have a particularly debilitating effect on long-distance job finding: job offers are
usually insufficient to justify the cost of moving.
This effect is reinforced by the search behavior of both firms and workers. Since low skilled employees bring little
value to firms, firms have less of an incentive to create such jobs. And they also spend comparatively less on job
advertising – particularly at longer distances. And for similar reasons, lower skilled workers apply for fewer jobs,
and especially in other towns.
Returns to employment are limited in low skilled markets for three reasons. First, average labor productivity is
lower relative to out-of-work income. Second, skills are less specialized, so there is less incentive to search hard
for the ideal job match. For example, there is little advantage to stacking shelves in a San Francisco shop
compared to one in Detroit. And third, job tenures tend to be shorter (presumably linked to low productivity), which
makes it harder to justify leaving home for the sake of a particular job.
In this sense, low skilled labor markets are poorly integrated geographically. This can be appreciated from
patterns in speculative migration: that is, moving without a job in hand. This is clearly a risky strategy, which
explains why it is rare. But, Figure 3 shows it is more common among the low skilled. Among high school
dropouts, a quarter of job-motivated cross-county moves are speculative, compared to just 5 percent for those
with postgraduate qualifications. Low skilled engagement in this strategy is testament to the slim investment of
firms in long-distance recruitment.
Figure 3 – Proportion of job-motivated moves which are speculative (1999-2013)
Source: Current Population Survey.
There is a popular view in academic and policy circles that low skilled immobility is driven by relatively high
moving costs. For example, financial constraints might be tighter and local family or social ties might be stronger.
But, it turns out this view is inconsistent with US survey evidence.  When questioned about their future plans, low
skilled workers are perfectly realistic about their limited prospects of moving away for work. But despite this, there
is no difference across education groups in self-reported willingness to move (these subjective measures are
good predictors of individuals’ future migration decisions). The evidence instead points to differences in the
availability of attractive jobs and information on those jobs. This is backed up by other survey responses and wage
dynamics at the individual level.
In recent years, many have advocated relocation assistance for the unemployed to improve access to distant
employment opportunities. But, my findings suggest that policy interventions which address migration costs
exclusively may only have a limited impact on employment. Low skilled immobility is less a cause of joblessness
and more a symptom of the meagre returns to work associated with low levels of education. These problems can
be better addressed by investing in education and skills directly. Of course, this is easier said than done. 
This article is based on the LSE CEP Discussion Paper ‘Why are Higher Skilled Workers More Mobile
Geographically? The Role of the Job Surplus’. 
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